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Abstract: This study of the annual reports of the Illinois Central 
Railroad (IC) from the 1850s supports a conclusion that the state-
ments, as to form and content, were developed to serve the needs of 
two classes of investors and to inform the general community of the 
activities of the company. The need to report to the public as to the 
success of the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the 
state required details of a demographic nature, which were provided 
by the land commissioner. Operating results provided evidence of the 
ability to service the debts held by European investors and to inform 
British venture capitalists of the extent of the company’s operations. 
This communication with the distant capital providers was a new 
development in financial reporting as the capital-intensive railroads 
 experienced management and ownership separation on a scale not 
seen before. In summary, the IC provided annual reports more de-
tailed and informative than those of other corporations of the period 
because of a need to provide European investors with evidence of 
management’s activities.
INTRODUCTION
 From as early as the 1850s, the Illinois Central Railroad 
(IC) published annual reports aimed at both the general, non-
investing, American public and the European (primarily British) 
capital markets, which represented the majority of investors. Al-
though the IC, because of the way it was founded, was a unique 
corporation that had a greater responsibility to the general pub-
lic than do most for-profit corporations, its reporting provides 
an excellent example of duality reporting at its finest since its 
annual reports addressed the needs of both audiences.
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 The IC, sometimes called the “Main Line of Mid-America,” 
was America’s first coast-to-coast railroad system, extending 
from Lake Michigan in the north to the Gulf of Mexico. The IC 
was also America’s first land-grant railroad, and thus an experi-
ment in social economy. The transportation that the IC provided 
was the intended product of the U.S. Congress when northern 
senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois and southern senators Jef-
ferson Davis of Mississippi (later president of the Confederate 
States) and William R. King of Alabama (later vice president of 
the U.S.) joined forces to provide an unprecedented form of fed-
eral subsidy that could link agricultural markets and shipping 
points in the emerging population centers in the Midwest and 
Mid-south. 
 The subsidy, in the form of federal land grants, was to shape 
the modernization of America’s frontier. America’s rich interior 
land was almost worthless without the access to markets that 
railroads were to provide. To opponents Senator King remarked 
[Carstensen, 1963, p. 128]: 
We are met by the objection that this is an immense 
grant – that it is a great quantity of land. Well, sir, it is 
a great quantity; but it will be there for five hundred 
years; and unless some mode of the kind proposed be 
adopted, it will never command ten cents.
 This paper, based on the IC’s corporate annual reports 
from the 1850s, analyzes the impact of the land grants (public 
investment) and more traditional private investment, primar-
ily by British investors, on the railroad and the corresponding 
development of the American frontier. These corporate reports 
provided not only financial details to benefit the British capital-
ists who invested in the road, but also a longitudinal view of the 
results of the company’s impact on the development of Illinois 
and related markets. Further, the farmers and merchants who 
were to be the principal customers and beneficiaries of the IC’s 
 services were also parties interested in the information provided 
in these increasingly detailed and complex annual reports. The 
analysis begins with the IC’s first report and ends with the onset 
of the Civil War. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
first section identifies the principal research questions, followed 
by a review of the origins and background of the IC. A section 
on the land-grant legislation of 1850 is provided to give the 
reader historic perspective. Next, the economic development 
and capital sourcing plan, especially as it pertains to its influ-
ence on financial statements for the period 1851 through 1861, 
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is examined. An assessment of the content of the shareholder re-
ports relative to the communication of operating objectives and 
economic development to the European investors follows. The 
paper concludes with observations about the research questions, 
including implications for further research.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
 The IC annual reports of the 1850s were quite detailed and 
information laden. Therefore, the principal research question 
addressed in this paper is, why did the IC management publish 
the type and amount of information found in them? In short, 
what dictated the form and content of these early corporate 
reports? Such reports were neither mandatory nor common 
among other types of entities. Other railroads, including the 
Pennsylvania, dating from 1847, and the Baltimore and Ohio, 
commencing in 1827, produced quite different reports in terms 
of style, content, and form.1 By undertaking this archival investi-
gation of an antebellum corporate enterprise, the hope is to add 
to the knowledge of the role of information provided to British 
capital markets during a period that has been seldom studied. 
 Although the IC is an important company to study for 
purely historical reasons, it is also important for contemporary 
reasons. Recently, the IC agreed to a merger with the Canadian 
National Railway Co., which creates a railway system extend-
ing from Halifax in the east, Vancouver and Seattle in the west, 
to New Orleans in the south, with Chicago as the geographic 
center. A further 15-year alliance with the Kansas City Southern 
Railway, which operates Mexico’s Transportation Ferroviaria 
Mexicana, will produce a 25,000 mile rail network to capture 
fast-growing cargo traffic stimulated by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. Again in the 21st century, the “Mainline 
of Mid-America” is being positioned to become the “Mainline of 
North America.” More importantly, examining the financial dis-
closures of the early railroads gives insight into how new tech-
nology impacts accounting and corporate reporting. A parallel 
between the railroad revolution and the Internet revolution can 
be drawn.
1Noteworthy is the fact that railroads, even in their earliest years of devel-
opment, presented lengthy annual reports with many tables and exhibits laden 
with data. Thus, the IC was not unique among railroads in this regard. By con-
trast, the annual reports of industrial companies fifty years later were “postcard” 
size with very little detailed information since such data were considered “pro-
prietary.”
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BACKGROUND 
 The federal land-grant legislation of September 1850 
marked the first time that public lands from the U.S. fed-
eral government were to be used to aid in the construction of 
a private rail line [Stover, 1975, p. 15].2 Senator Stephen A. 
 Douglas was the main supporter of the bill in Congress, with 
help in the House from Abraham Lincoln. An original bill in 
1848, limited to public lands in Illinois, was narrowly defeated. 
In 1850, Senators King and Davis amended the bill to extend the 
grants to the southern states. With this new source of support, 
the bill passed the Senate in May and the House in September. 
Initially, there was concern that President Taylor would veto the 
bill because of his possible sympathies for New Orleans. Taylor 
was a plantation owner from Louisiana, and the bill appeared 
to favor Mobile over New Orleans. However, Taylor died in July 
1850, shortly before the bill was approved by Congress. Fillmore 
became president and signed the bill on September 20, 1850, 
within three days after it had passed the House [Stover, 1975, 
pp. 19-21].
 As noted in Senator King’s statement in the introduction, 
the main argument in support of the legislation was the opinion 
that the federal land was worthless without a railroad in the vi-
cinity, and no railroad would build where there was no popula-
tion. However, if a portion of the land were given to the railroad, 
in checkerboard fashion, the remaining land still owned by the 
government would become far more valuable. Thus, the sale 
of the land could be used to finance the railroad, which in turn 
made both the railroad’s land and the government’s land more 
valuable. In reality, Congress viewed the land grants not as sub-
sidies, but as investments to make federal land marketable.
 As the Illinois legislature began meeting in 1851, there were 
three rival groups vying for the right to build the railroad in Il-
linois and receive the federal grant of over 2.5 million acres. 
The winning group, composed of Eastern capitalists, was led by 
Robert Schuyler (“America’s Railroad King”) and Robert Ran-
toul [Stover, 1975, p. 26]. This group’s earlier successful develop-
ment of the New York and New Haven Railroad seemed to be 
an important ingredient, given the need for the involvement of 
credible and experienced management. In return for the rights 
to the federal grant, the Schuyler/Rantoul group agreed to pay 
2State governments had previously used land grants to support canal build-
ing [Baskin and Miranti, 1997, p. 133].
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the state a tax consisting of a percentage of gross receipts. This 
tax, set by the legislature at seven percent, exempted the corpo-
ration from paying Illinois state and local taxes.3 Eventually, the 
revenue from this tax enabled the state to pay off its debts from 
an ill-fated internal improvements program of 1837. The IC was 
officially chartered on February 10, 1851, when the Illinois gov-
ernor signed the charter bill after passage by both houses of the 
legislature. 
 The IC is the only major rail carrier in the U.S. that oper-
ated under its charter name for more than 150 years. Chartered 
on February 10, 1851, parts of the IC system date back even 
further. For example, the West Feliciana Railroad in Mississippi, 
chartered in 1831 as the first railroad west of the Appalachians, 
became a part of the IC in 1892 [Stover, 1975, p. 228]. As noted 
previously, the IC was the first land-grant railroad in America. 
The land-grant details specified that the states of Illinois, Mis-
sissippi, and Alabama were granted a right of way through the 
public lands for the construction of a railroad to extend from 
the western end of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to Mobile, 
Alabama, by way of Cairo, with a branch to Dubuque, Iowa, by 
way of Galena and another to Chicago [Gates, 1934]. The Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad would be the southern land grant railroad to 
complete the link of the Great Lakes and Gulf Coast when the 
lines met on the Ohio River at Cairo. 
 Notable political and popular figures were associated with 
the IC. Its corporate attorney in the 1850s was Abraham Lin-
coln. Some of Lincoln’s most famous cases were on behalf of 
the IC, and his son later became a director of the company. The 
promoters and senior managers of the early IC included many 
linked to important names in American financial circles. Jona-
than Sturges (1782-1863), a founding director who participated 
in the syndicate to incorporate the IC, had learned business in 
the counting houses of Boston, and eventually formed his own 
investment concern [Johnson and Supple, 1967, p. 22]. Sturges’ 
youngest daughter Amelia married J. Pierpont Morgan in 1861. 
Tragically, she suffered from tuberculosis and died on their hon-
3 This exemption had far-reaching implications. When McLean County tried 
to assess the IC’s property, corporate attorney Abraham Lincoln took the case to 
the State Supreme Court where the local exemption for both land and operating 
property was validated. The result was that buyers of railroad lands were content 
to delay payment on land notes for as long as possible so the land would stay 
under IC ownership and be exempt from taxes. As long as the landholders were 
willing to pay interest, the IC management was willing to be lenient with respect 
to payment terms [Decker, 1964, p. 13].
5
Flesher et al.: Early American corporate reporting and European capital markets: The case of the Illinois Central Railroad, 1851-1861
Published by eGrove, 2006
Accounting Historians Journal, June 20068  
eymoon abroad [Baughman, 1966]. Another daughter of Sturges 
married William H. Osborn, who was to become a dominant fig-
ure in the IC from 1853 to 1882 [Cochran, 1953, p. 422]. Osborn, 
who became involved in 1853 when President Robert Schuyler 
“retired,” is identified as the president of the IC as early as 1855 
[Brownson, 1915, p. 41]. Popular and folk heroes identified 
with the IC abound. Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) piloted IC 
steamboats on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers from 1859 to 
1861.4 Train engineer “Casey” Jones died on the IC’s “Cannonball 
Express” train wreck at Vaughn, Mississippi, in 1900. George 
B. McClellan and at least 19 other Civil War generals served as 
corporate officers of the IC either before or following the war. In 
fact, the 1857 annual report identifies McClellan (later Lincoln’s 
opponent in the 1864 presidential election) as the only vice pres-
ident [Stover, 1975]. Another future general, Ambrose Burnside 
(the inventor of sideburns), was the treasurer in 1860. 
 Within four years of being chartered, the IC had more than 
600 miles of track, making it by the mid-1850s the longest rail-
road in the world, bisecting Illinois from Chicago to Cairo and 
veering westward at Galena into Iowa.
FINANCING THE IC
 The incorporators’ plan for financing the IC was simple 
and, to insiders, most attractive. They anticipated using the land 
grant as security for a bond issue, primarily to European inves-
tors, the proceeds of which would pay for construction. There-
after the bonds could be paid off with proceeds from the sale 
of the land, whose value was enhanced by the passenger and 
freight transportation provided by the railroad. This plan would 
permit the incorporators to own the railroad and to operate it 
with minimal investment.5 It was outlined in a letter in 1851 
from one of the incorporators to a Boston business associate as 
follows [Johnson and Supple, 1967, pp. 134-135]: 
The fact is that it is expected to pay for the whole Road 
by the sale of lands – It would be rather a singular thing 
if it should turn out that this company should own a 
Road . . . and cost the stockholders [the present ones] 
4Before a bridge could be built across the Ohio River, the IC exchanged 
freight shipments with the M&O via steamboat. Thus, coast-to-coast rail ser-
vice was available even before the two lines were connected via the Ohio River 
Bridge.
5The leveraged buy-out artists of the 1980s merely were mimicking the busi-
ness model of the “Railroad King” who won the bid to build and operate the IC.
6
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/11
9Flesher, Previts, & Samson: Illinois Central Railroad
nothing. . . . Come . . . see for yourself – all depends on 
the selling of the Bonds. Please keep this to yourself.
 In March 1851, the IC board of directors held its first meet-
ing, elected Schuyler as president, and authorized a deposit 
of $200,000 with the State of Illinois to guarantee good faith 
on behalf of the incorporators. The $200,000 came from the 
sale of stock to the 13 incorporators6 [Stover, 1975, pp. 28-30]. 
The incorporators wanted to keep their cash investments at a 
 minimum, and they would later respond to assessments of their 
stock that would far exceed their original plan or intention. 
Bond sales were slow, particularly in Europe where investors, 
especially in Great Britain, were wary of the State of Illinois 
because it had missed interest payments on several loan agree-
ments related to the financing of earlier public works projects. 
However, by adding options to buy stock, large quantities of 
bonds were eventually sold in mid-1852 in both the U.S. and in 
Europe [Stover, 1975, p. 35].
 In the fall of 1851, IC president Schuyler had dispatched 
Robert J. Walker, a former secretary of the treasury during the 
Polk administration, to England to sell IC mortgage construc-
tion bonds. Walker had many wealthy friends in Great Britain. 
He was to receive a one percent commission per dollar of debt 
placed. David Neal, an IC vice president, sailed with Walker on 
the Atlantic, the finest and fastest Cunard line ship. Upon reach-
ing Liverpool, Neal continued to Holland to try to place the IC 
bonds with Amsterdam and Rotterdam investors. It was initially 
felt that the bonds would be easily placed because of the 2.5 
million acres of land serving as collateral for the debt. Unfortu-
nately for the IC, the missions of Walker and Neal failed miser-
ably. No bonds were sold. Europeans wanted nothing to do with 
any security with “Illinois” on it, given the investors’ experience 
with their 1837 Illinois bonds, $15 million of which were still 
outstanding and in default [Stover, 1975, pp. 32-35]. 
 Another reason that the IC bonds could not be placed was 
that the IC was headed by Robert Schuyler, a “gambler, not 
a railroad man” in the eyes of the Europeans who had prior in-
vestment experiences with Schuyler railroads. Second, William 
H. Swift, a West Pointer and former army officer, was advising 
the British investment house of Barings Brothers that the IC 
land, which backed the bonds, was being appraised at too high a 
6Actually, the incorporators subscribed to $1,000,000 of stock, but the initial 
assessment was for only 20% of the stock subscribed [Stover, 1975, p. 32].
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value by company officials [Stover, 1975, p. 33]. In actuality, the 
2.5 million acres were probably not worth more than $3 million 
in 1851, but company estimates placed their future value (1856) 
at a hundred times greater, an appraisal that seemed extremely 
far-fetched at the time but was to prove accurate. In addition to 
Barings, the House of Rothschild also turned down the offer to 
buy IC bonds. Walker and Neal returned to America in Decem-
ber 1851 without a single bond sold.
 Spring 1852 brought new hope to the IC. First, $4 million 
of bonds were sold to U.S. investors. These bonds carried a 
seven percent interest rate with an option to buy ten shares of 
stock for each $1,000 bond. This latter feature made the bond 
sale successful. The IC directors realized that the equity had to 
be increased since the ownership interest could not be limited 
to only 13 investors. During the same time that the bonds were 
sold, the Michigan Central Railroad subscribed to $2 million of 
IC notes in exchange for the right to use the IC rail line into Chi-
cago after it was built. The Michigan Central had no access into 
Chicago and was desperate. Consequently, despite the disdain 
that its management had for the over-leveraged IC, the Michigan 
Central helped the IC start its construction.
 With this start-up capital raised, David Neal and George W. 
Billings sailed to England in March 1852 to try again to sell IC 
bonds. This time the English investment syndicate headed by 
Charles Devaux & Company bought $5 million of IC bonds. The 
interest rate was six percent and the owner of each $1,000 bond 
was given the option to acquire five shares of IC stock. Again, 
it was that option that made the loan attractive to the Devaux 
syndicate. In addition, extant copies of the bonds (see Exhibit 
1) indicate that the investors were allowed to pay in the loaned 
amount in ten quarterly installments starting in August 1852 
and ending on October 1, 1854. This payment schedule coin-
cided with the IC’s need for financing its construction progress. 
With the bond issue fully subscribed by August 16, 1852, Neal 
and Billings set sail for America knowing that the IC had the 
financing that would guarantee the construction of the railroad 
[Stover, 1975, p. 35].
 The IC’s construction began, but scandal soon overtook the 
organization. Schuyler, the IC’s absentee, part-time president, 
was its first wreck even before the trains began running. Be-
tween the fall of 1853 and the summer of 1854, Schuyler found 
that holding the dual roles of both the president and the transfer 
agent for the New York and New Haven Railroad, in addition to 
his presidency of the IC, was too tempting, and he succumbed 
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to selling unauthorized shares of the New York and New Ha-
ven stock and pocketing the proceeds. When Schuyler became 
ill in early July 1854, Morris Ketchum, the locomotive builder 
and one of the IC’s founders, took over Schuyler’s duties and 
uncovered his misdeeds. Schuyler resigned from all of his posts 
and fled to Canada. Even though the IC was not involved in the 
fraud, European investors were shaken. By late August 1854, 
IC bond prices had fallen to 62% of their face amount with the 
stock plummeting as well [Stover, 1975, pp. 35-36].
 The commencement of operations, however, soon led inves-
tors to forget the Schuyler matter. During the next two years, 
European ownership of IC securities increased. The price of the 
IC securities rebounded as the farmland sales in Illinois were 
being promoted throughout the European continent. By 1856, 
80,000 shares of IC stock ($100 par value) and $12 million of 
EXHIBIT 1
Illinois Central 1852 Installment Bond
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bonds were held by European investors, primarily British. The 
bonds, because of the right to subscribe to stock, were an attrac-
tive but speculative investment. In particular, the subscription 
price of $20 controlled the $100 par stock. This was a highly lev-
eraged way of speculating in the completion of the railroad. The 
British ownership of IC securities amounted to over 50% of the 
outstanding subscribed shares; Dutch and American investors 
each owned 15%. Thus, within the U.S., the IC was viewed as a 
foreign-owned corporation. Among the largest IC shareholders 
were noteworthy Englishmen such as Richard Cobden, William 
Gladstone, John Bright, and Samuel Cunard (the shipping mag-
nate).7 
 Investors were caught off guard on August 10, 1854, when 
the IC demanded a $5 per share call against the common stock 
subscribers. This call was followed by another $5 per share call 
on December 10, 1854. These calls for additional capital con-
tributions were a surprise because the shareholders had sub-
scribed to the IC stock believing that their $20 down payment 
for each $100 share would be the extent of their investment. 
This understanding had been based on the early leverage strat-
egy employed by the initial directors. Actually, the 1854 assess-
ments were due to cost overruns on construction
 By 1857, IC stock was selling for $120 per share, and bonds 
were selling at par or higher. According to the American Railroad 
Journal, “no other Company enjoyed the unlimited confidence of 
money lenders of England and America to the same extent,” as 
the IC [Corliss, 1951, p. 92]. This rapture was quick to change. 
The Panic of 1857 affected all companies in America. Illinois 
land speculators who had borrowed to buy federal land on the 
expectation of rising land prices were hard hit. This, in turn, led 
to bank foreclosures and land sales at distressed prices. The Eu-
ropean investors became concerned about the value of their col-
lateral, the two million unsold acres that the IC held. The value 
of the land from the federal grant again became an important 
issue to European investors. By September 1857, there had been 
more calls on equity investors for capital. At the same time, 
7Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright were all members of the British Parliament 
at various times in their careers. Gladstone, a former Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, became prime minister in 1868. In his early career, he had been junior 
lord of the Treasury and under-secretary for the colonies. In 1844, he had been 
responsible for the passage of a railway bill. Cobden and Bright were defeated 
in the 1857 election, and Gladstone was put out of office that year because of 
the change in prime ministers. As a result, all three seemed to have leisure time 
available to deal with IC issues.
10
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/11
13Flesher, Previts, & Samson: Illinois Central Railroad
both stock and bond prices had dropped about 50% during the 
year. This led to British investors forming the London Protec-
tive Committee. William Gladstone, a former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was elected the head of the group. The IC’s 1858 an-
nual report to shareholders noted, with respect to these London 
meetings [IC, March 16, 1859, p. 2]: 
. . . no direct representative of the company, intimate 
with its affairs and fully cognizant of the various ramifi-
cations of its interests, is present to take part in the dis-
cussions, can hardly fail to be injurious to the general 
interests, and the Directors respectfully suggest to the 
English Shareholders that at least sixty day’s notice of 
any such meeting and its objects, be given, that, if pos-
sible, one of their number may be present. 
 From the time the first bonds had been issued in 1852, the 
British shareholders had exerted a powerful influence on the af-
fairs of the IC, but the Panic of 1857 caused the overseas inves-
tors to seek even more control over the company’s operations. 
The 1858 annual report stated that two gentlemen from the 
London Protective Committee had visited Chicago to examine 
the company’s books. It is likely that they also inspected the rail-
road’s assets, including the constructed line and the unsold acres 
of land. Apparently, this visit was positive for both sides, and the 
result was an attempt to arrange a line of communication be-
tween management and the English investors [IC, 1857, p. 2].
 In 1859, Gladstone appointed Richard Cobden to come to 
America to evaluate the true condition of the IC. Cobden was 
reportedly impressed with what he saw. After seeing the quality 
of the company’s lands, Cobden wrote back to England of his 
support for President Osborn and his endorsement of the fiscal 
policies of the company [Stover, 1975, p. 37]. In return for his 
support, Cobden had a town named for him in southern Illinois 
as did other British shareholders Lawrence Heyworth and Sir 
Joseph Paxton [Corliss, 1951, p. 92]. The 1859 annual report [IC, 
1859, p. 1] noted:
At the urgent request of the London Committee, the 
Directors deferred calls [assessments] in 1858 and 1859, 
although they believed then, as they do at the present 
moment, that the fact of this Company situated as it is, 
with unassessed capital, presenting itself as a borrower 
for short periods, at high rates of interest, has been 
the chief reason for the depreciation of its securities in 
 public estimation.
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The “interference” with the London Protective Committee was 
then discussed [IC, 1859, p. 2]:
London Committee: The experience of the past year has 
confirmed the Board in the opinion expressed in the 
last annual report, that it is not practicable to act with 
sufficient promptness and efficiency in concert with a 
Committee of Shareholders in London, inasmuch as a 
decision upon the Company’s affairs cannot be speedily 
arrived at by correspondence: therefore the Board will 
consider their relations with the Committee as termi-
nated, unless otherwise directed at the next meeting of 
the Shareholders. We are informed that a majority of 
the present Committee concur in this opinion.
EARLY CORPORATE REPORTING, 1851-18618
 At a time when the patterns and expectations about the con-
tent of published annual reports were not well established, the 
IC was thorough in its reporting. In retrospect, the European 
investors should have been able to get a reasonable understand-
ing of the company’s operations from the published reports. The 
stockholder report series began with a three-page report dated 
November 20, 1852. That report covered the activities from the 
founding of the company on February 10, 1851 through Novem-
ber 1, 1852. A rudimentary receipts and expenditures statement 
and a budget (ways and means) statement are all that accom-
pany the single-page letter of President Schuyler. 
 This first report provides few clues about the capital forma-
tion and construction issues that would develop in the years to 
follow. This is not unexpected given the fact that most of the 
issues had not yet been worked out and probably no real plans 
had yet been developed. The next report (from approximately 
November 1852 to December 31, 1853) has not been located 
although it is listed in the catalog at the Newberry Library. The 
next available report, which contains financial statements for 
1854, although dated January 1, 1855, is addressed to the Di-
rectors of the Road. There were 441 shareholders identified as 
subscribing to 127,690 shares as of that date. The statements 
provided in the 1854 report are identified with the capital letters 
A, B, C, and D. The four are (A) a type of balance sheet, (B) a 
form of expenditures statement, (C) a unique interest fund state-
8The IC annual reports are available at the Newberry Library in Chicago [see 
Mohr, 1951, for holdings], the Williams Library at the University of Mississippi, 
and the Bruno Library at the University of Alabama.
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ment, and (D) a budget (ways and means) reporting the status 
of bonded indebtedness.9 The latter two appear to respond to 
the terms of the mortgage bond indenture agreement of June 
23, 1852, between the IC and the bond trustees. The terms of 
the agreement, as detailed in sections six, seven, and eight of the 
indenture, appear to establish a special account for the funding 
of interest payments. Steps were taken to prioritize interest pay-
ments, including assigning operating revenues for that purpose 
as needed and earmarking 250,000 acres of land as security for 
the payment of interest.
 By the end of 1855, the first full year of operations, the re-
port had expanded to over 50 pages of fine print. The financial 
statements are provided on four pages (pp. 13-16) and follow the 
pattern of the previous year but without the alphabetic designa-
tors. Although there was no external auditor, the statements for 
years after 1854 were examined and approved by a three-man 
audit committee of the board of directors. 
 The need to produce such summary statements from de-
tailed records, as found in these early years, versus using the 
records themselves seems clear. There was no “income state-
ment” because operations did not begin until late 1854. Also, the 
company did not begin public land sales until October 1, 1854, 
although, as indicated earlier, land had been pledged as security 
on various bond issues and to secure the interest fund. 
 A full balance sheet appears for the first time for the year 
ended 1856. Each line of the balance sheet is keyed to abstracts, 
identified as A through H and printed immediately below the 
balance sheet, that provide details on the capital stock, the con-
struction bonds, the free land bonds, and the other keyed lines 
on the balance sheet; e.g., short-term debt (scrip) and floating 
(working capital) liabilities. The statement set concludes with 
a novel determination of net earnings, which is then reconciled 
with the interest fund to assure adequacy of that account. The 
next year’s statements follow this pattern of reporting, and a 
9 Alphabetic designation of reports, it should be observed, was found to be 
a common practice in the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad statements beginning 
shortly after it was established in 1827 [Previts and Samson, 2000]. However, the 
B&O statements are different in content. So it does not appear that the IC was 
simply following the pattern of other established roads, but more likely was re-
sponding to the information needs of the British creditors who were concerned 
about the integrity of their interest payments and the related principal. Lardner 
[1850, p. 424] referred to detailed reports with numbered statements in his 1850 
book on railway economics. He stated that such practices were not typical in 
Britain, but were used by Belgian railroads.
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resume of cash transactions (a cash-flow statement with full 
particulars) is added. With minor exceptions, through the year 
ended 1861, the form and content of the IC financial statements 
seem to follow what was established by 1856, with a balance 
sheet detailing the assets committed to the interest fund as the 
principal statement. The IC’s income statement, designated as 
the “Interest Fund Account” (see Exhibit 2), was not carried to 
stockholders’ equity, but to an account essentially equivalent to 
“Bondholders’ Equity.” Again, this was an indirect capitulation 
to the British venture capitalists and their claims to the earnings 
streams of the company. The concept is in sharp contrast to pro-
prietary theory, which would call for the residual to be credited 
to owners’ equity. 
 Comparative columns are added in some instances in the 
annual reports, such as for expenditures, so that trends between 
years, starting in 1852, can be studied. In fact, the reports are 
useful benchmarking documents with many examples of five-
year trends.
 The 1857 report contains an opening statement that asserts 
that the annual report is indeed a report to provide information 
useful for investment decision making [IC, 1857, p. 1]:
The Directors submit herewith the Reports and State-
ments of the Officers of the Company in charge of the 
several Departments of its business, to which the care-
ful examination of the Shareholders is invited, as af-
fording sufficient data to enable each proprietor to form 
his own judgment as to the value of his investment and 
the details of its administration. 
 Many examples can be found of analyses of managerial de-
cisions; for instance, the 1859 report [IC, 1859, p. 6] includes a 
study of the advantage of burning coal over wood. Finally, the 
economic development of the region is highlighted.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORTING
 Beginning with 1854, the tenor of the annual reports began 
to change with respect to the information content about the 
railroad’s impact on economic development. The 1854 report 
referred to the growth of new towns along the line and the fi-
nancing by bankers of coal fields in the vicinity of the railroad. 
Economic development was occurring and following the path of 
the railroad. The report [IC, 1854, p. 1] states that:
The Prairie lands of Illinois are the garden of North 
America, and when peopled will become the granary of 
14
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the Mississippi. The Illinois Central R.R. passes through 
the best of them, bringing them within easy reach of a 
market. Its lands also include large and valuable Coal 
fields.
 When rail operations began, management presented finan-
cial information in great detail, including monthly revenues 
and costs at each depot along the line. Revenues by depot were 
also listed by the nature of the item shipped. The 1855 report 
included a spreadsheet with 32 columns for the transportation 
of different types of commodities, including wheat, rye, hogs, 
whiskey, apples, butter, cheese, and coal. Such detail, in ever-
declining print size, continued throughout the pre-Civil War 
era. By 1860, the spreadsheet had 42 columns, all prepared 
without benefit of computer. The IC management also provided 
extensive commentary on the economic environment within 
which the company operated. For instance, in the 1855 report, 
a table listed every station along the line, with columns for the 
population, the number of houses, and the number of churches, 
schools, stores, hotels, mills, factories, and physicians in 1850 
and 1855 [IC, 1855, p. 3]. The 1855 report went on to mention 
the growth in the importance of coal traffic on the railroad: “We 
are fully persuaded that the coal traffic will become one of the 
most important elements of profit to this road” [IC, 1855, p. 4]. 
The report also included a forecast of $2.5 million of income for 
1856 and a prediction that the road could be operated for fifty 
percent of its gross revenues. 
 Given that the IC owned a great deal of land, it was only 
appropriate that the annual report discuss the sale of land to 
settlers, which amounted to $5,598,577.83 for 528,863 acres, or 
over $10 per acre in 1855. The 1855 report also mentioned that 
since the 1851 grant, the federal government had disposed of 
nearly three million acres of land within 15 miles of the com-
pany’s tracks, and that the counties adjacent to the railroad had 
experienced a population increase of over 250,000 between 1850 
and 1855 [IC, 1855, p. 5]. At the time the report was issued in 
March 1856, the IC had 515 stockholders, mostly British, hold-
ing 129,256 shares, each share having thus far been assessed for 
an average of $20 [IC, 1856, p. 9]. 
 Management identified itself with the economic develop-
ment in the region in the 1855 report with the following para-
graph [IC, 1855, pp. 10-11]: 
. . . an examination of the statistics of the progress of 
the country since it has been opened by railroad com-
16
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munication, evidences the great value of the Company’s 
lands, from which, in the opinion of the Board, the en-
tire cost of the road will be realized, leaving free of cost 
to the Stockholders, the revenues of this great highway, 
which unites the waters of the Northern Lakes, with 
those of the Ohio and Mississippi, soon to be joined 
at Cairo by the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, . . . and will, 
when completed, form the great avenue of communica-
tion from the Northern States, to the important cities of 
the Gulf of Mexico.
The above comment was after the 1854 assessment call on stock 
subscribers, yet management still was maintaining that the en-
tire cost of the road would be paid for from land sales, leaving 
the revenues “free of cost to the Stockholders.”
 In the annual report section entitled the “Report of the Land 
Commissioner,” there were indications that the report might 
have some public relations or marketing objectives, a factor not 
atypical from modern annual reports.10 It was noted that some 
of the company’s land “is rolling, undulating like the waves of 
the ocean under the influence of a gentle breeze” [IC, 1854, p. 
42]. Other pages celebrated the fertility of the soil, the massive 
deposits of coal and other minerals, and the fact that the lands 
were well watered. This line of argument concluded with the im-
pact on economic development [IC, 1854, pp. 43-44]:
 In no other instance, probably, have such abundant 
benefits flowed from like causes. To the Government, 
the lands were comparatively valueless; to the State, 
they were in no way profitable; to the farmers, their pro-
ductiveness was of no avail, while the quarries of stone 
and marble, and mines of coal with which the lands 
abound, were wholly undeveloped. . . . This Company 
took these lands thus comparatively valueless . . . , and 
by the expenditure of about twenty millions of  dollars, 
imparted vitality to the whole matter by the construc-
tion and equipment of this road.
 In the event that stockholders, many of whom were in far 
off England, failed to understand the underlying meaning of the 
preceding statements, a concluding paragraph attributed to the 
company president bragged [IC, 1854, p. 46]:
The gain to the State has been a largely increased popu-
10 For a study of the public relations and marketing aspects of annual re-
ports, see Graves et al., 1996.
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lation of industrious, intelligent, and enterprising citi-
zens, chiefly producers, a very heavy increase of taxable 
property, an immense acquisition of trade and capital, 
and seven per cent of the gross receipts of this road, 
which will soon go far towards relieving the people 
from all taxation for State purposes.
President Osborn was publicizing the economic progress of the 
state being served by the company, thereby promoting the IC’s 
cause. Whether this was for the purposes of encouraging further 
land sales or merely an attempt to appeal to the penurious inter-
ests of European investors cannot be known.11 Nevertheless, it 
should have accomplished both purposes.
 The 1856 annual report continued the story of economic 
development, with analyses by the directors of changes that had 
occurred in virtually every town along the line. For Kankakee, 
it was noted that the population had swelled to 3,000 and that 
“this will become a smart inland town, being beautifully situat-
ed; eligible lots are worth $750 to $1,200. It is difficult to realize 
that 3 years since the tract of timber, about 900 acres, on which 
the town is located, was sold at $15 per acre.” For most towns 
and villages, the report was glowing with respect to develop-
ment. For Cairo, it was noted that land prices had doubled from 
the preceding year [IC, 1856, p. 2].
 Much of the 1857 annual report was devoted to the prob-
lems the company had faced due to the Panic of 1857, a major 
snowfall in January and February, and record floods late in the 
year. All of these dislocations slowed railway operations. Still, 
there was room for continued discussion of economic develop-
ment. For example, it was noted that on the west side of the 
tracks from Calumet to Mattoon, a distance of 150 miles, there 
had been erected 639 dwellings, 400 out-buildings, 114 orchards, 
and 56,352 plowed acres, none of which existed a few years ear-
lier [IC, 1857, p. 9]. 
 The question remains as to why IC management elected to 
publish such detailed annual reports, given that they were not 
11The European investors, noting the extensive and “lavish” IC advertise-
ments for land in their newspapers and magazines had been concerned about 
the “waste” of money. However, the ads did seem to support the outcome of 
drawing large numbers of European immigrants as the availability of rich, cheap 
farm land was appealing in a place where land was held by the nobility and the 
landless worked for this gentry. Victims of the Irish potato famine were also tar-
gets of the ads. The IC reports were intended to soothe the European investors’ 
concern that the ads were a waste of money.
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mandated to do so by the corporate charter. It appears that both 
subsequent contracts, (1) the bond indenture with British inves-
tors and the corresponding need to establish organizational le-
gitimacy, and (2) the need to promote land sales, were addressed 
by the form and content of the annual reports. Such detail also 
might have been a way of signaling directors and distant inves-
tors that management had control over operations. To this end, 
writing to J. Newton Perkins, the treasurer, in July 1856, Osborn 
observed [Cochran, 1953, p. 423]:
I do not think any of them [directors] are aware of what 
an immense machine this is to handle and I do wish 
them to understand more fully the details of this enter-
prise. I am left alone to this business and have no time 
for my family and for those hours of leisure which the 
other gentlemen enjoy.
If Osborn thought the directors did not understand the extent of 
operations, he surely had even stronger feelings about the dis-
tant European venture capitalists. 
 Management was desirous of reporting more than finan-
cial numbers. In the broadest sense of corporate reporting and 
communication, the accounting that occurred went “beyond 
the numbers” to include evidence relating to economic develop-
ment. Management indeed believed that the IC was the core of 
economic development in the Midwest, and that development 
was a virtue for which the IC should be recognized. Ultimately, 
the IC was the source of many precedents. Later land-grant rail-
roads adopted the IC’s classification and appraisal system as well 
as its contract and credit systems. In addition, the IC’s coloniza-
tion and advertising techniques were later used by other land-
grant railroads [Decker, 1964, p. 101].
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 This study of the earliest annual reports to shareholders 
of the IC supports a conclusion that the statements, as to form 
and content, were developed to serve the needs of two classes 
of statement users, European investors and politicians, on the 
one hand, and the general community on the other. The bal-
ance sheet orientation and the interest fund emphasis indicate 
the need to provide the European bondholders with the data 
required by the bond indenture. A preliminary and supportable 
premise of this work is that the bond indenture was the legal 
agreement and document that drove the development of the 
IC’s financial report content. At the same time, the European 
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stockholders demanded more information than would an inves-
tor who could see the trains passing by on a daily basis, or who 
could see land being sold and farms and towns being developed. 
Further, the need to report to the public as to the success of 
the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the state 
required the details of transactions of a demographic nature, 
which were provided by the land commissioner. Operating de-
tails, on a station-by-station basis, also served as evidence of the 
impact of the railroad’s service in areas that had heretofore been 
wilderness. In modern parlance, the details of the reports might 
be rationalized by the need to establish organizational legitima-
cy [see Deegan, 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002]. 
 Alternatively, a critic might suggest that instead of trying to 
impress readers with the quality of reporting, management was 
merely trying to defend itself against investor criticisms with a 
quantitative response in the form of detailed analyses of routine 
items. The large quantity of data helped to hide recognition of 
conceptual issues for which management either had no answers 
or for which publication would cast the company in an unfavor-
able light, such as the deduction of depreciation expense. 
 During the 1850s, the IC was more than a railroad; it was 
the change agent in a major social experiment, an attempt by 
government to foster economic development by using raw, fer-
tile land to motivate not only corporate investors, but to attract 
a productive population as well. The glue that held this experi-
ment together was the financial capital provided by European 
investors. This experiment, as detailed in the narrative of the 
annual reports to shareholders, proved successful, at least that 
is the conclusion based on the information provided by IC man-
agement. Population and agricultural productivity swelled, de-
spite major disturbances, including the Panic of 1857.
 This project has assisted in identifying several reporting 
practices that had not heretofore been acknowledged. Examples 
are the early use of cash-flow statements, the identification of 
“net earnings,” and extensive social economic reporting. Per-
haps a more important example is the British investors’ practice 
of sending representatives to America to examine (audit?) the 
IC during the late1850s. To what extent this can be compared to 
the external audit of today is conjecture at this point, as well as 
whether this was the start of British auditors coming to America 
on behalf of English investors as occurred extensively several 
decades later. In any event, the dispatch of representatives of 
British investors was reassuring for those providers of capital 
as to the soundness of the IC assets, the progress made by the 
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railroad’s development program, and the reality of its financial 
numbers. Given Schuyler’s scandalous departure and the volatile 
and speculative economic condition of the “Wild West,” the use 
of an inspector/auditor representative seems most prudent given 
that the investors’ agency problem was magnified by distance. 
Finally, while not original with the IC, additional assurance of 
proper control over funds was ensured by the use of the audit 
committee of the board of directors.12 
 The examples in the preceding paragraph are not necessar-
ily to be construed as “firsts.” However, these early uses support 
an a priori belief that the corporate form of business, and the 
need to please distant European investors, served to justify and 
instigate such reporting practices. Further study, employing a 
larger set of antebellum railroad reports, is needed to support 
this assertion. For example, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, the 
IC’s southern sister, first issued British notes in 1854 through 
George Peabody, commencing the M&O’s relationship with the 
London capital market [Samson et al., 2003, p. 338]. The M&O 
annual reports seem to be equally informative as those of the IC. 
 Finally, this study represents an initial inquiry into the an-
nual shareholder reports of the IC. This major corporation, 
which began as an economic development project to some and 
a leveraged land speculation to others, appears to have enjoyed 
success by the end of the period under study. Sharing in this 
 success were European investors who made up the majority of 
the IC’s owners and creditors. More than just sharing in the suc-
cess, the European investors were seemingly responsible for the 
detailed financial reporting of the IC. The need to satisfy inves-
tors in another hemisphere led to detailed financial reporting at 
the IC and at future railroads that emulated it. This narrative 
ends with 1861, as by then the nation was engaged in a violent 
Civil War whose outcome would change the character and role 
of the IC and other railroads. That is another story. 
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